（一）我国国有控股上市公司股权激励概况

　　（1） Overview of Equity Incentives for State owned Listed Companies in China

　　自《上市公司股权激励管理办法》《国有控股上市公司（境外）实施股权激励试行办法》《国有控股上市公司（境内）实施股权激励试行办法》相继颁布实施之后，国有控股上市公司股权激励逐渐增多。根据上海荣正投资咨询有限公司发布的《2017中国企业家价值报告》统计，截至2017年3月24日，1022家国有控股上市公司共公告了121份国有控股上市公司股权激励方案，公告比例为9.90％。

　　Since the promulgation and implementation of the "Management Measures for Equity Incentives of Listed Companies", "Trial Measures for the Implementation of Equity Incentives of State owned Holding Listed Companies (Overseas)", and "Trial Measures for the Implementation of Equity Incentives of State owned Holding Listed Companies (Domestic)", equity incentives of state-owned holding listed companies have gradually increased. According to the "2017 China Entrepreneur Value Report" released by Shanghai Rongzheng Investment Consulting Co., Ltd., as of March 24, 2017, 1022 state-owned listed companies have announced a total of 121 equity incentive plans for state-owned listed companies, with an announcement ratio of 9.90%.

　　从统计结果显示的数量上看，在近十年实施股权激励计划的上市公司中，国有企业实施股权激励计划的公司数量明显少于民营企业实施股权激励的公司数量，主要原因在于国有控股上市公司受到的严格双重监管，导致其在审批流程、业绩考核、收益分配等各方面的要求都十分严苛，客观上为国有控股上市公司实施股权激励制造了障碍。

　　From the statistical results, it can be seen that among the listed companies that have implemented equity incentive plans in the past decade, the number of state-owned enterprises implementing equity incentive plans is significantly less than that of private enterprises. The main reason is that state-owned listed companies are subject to strict dual supervision, which leads to very strict requirements in the approval process, performance evaluation, income distribution, and other aspects, objectively creating obstacles for state-owned listed companies to implement equity incentives.

　　从统计结果显示的行业分布情况来看，已经实施过股权激励的国有控股上市公司行业分布比较广泛，包括制造业、电力、热力、燃气及水生产和供应业、房地产业、仓储和邮政业、交通运输、批发和零售业、租赁和商务服务业等，但从数量上看，我国国有控股上市公司中实施股权激励最多的行业是制造业，占比超过50％，其他行业占比较为分散。这种现象并非是市场原因造成的，而是由于在我国国有控股上市公司中，制造业企业本身就占有绝对多数的比重，客观上造成了实施股权激励的公司数量也相应增加。

　　From the distribution of industries shown in the statistical results, state-owned listed companies that have implemented equity incentives have a relatively wide industry distribution, including manufacturing, electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply, real estate, warehousing and postal, transportation, wholesale and retail, leasing and business services, etc. However, in terms of quantity, the manufacturing industry has implemented the most equity incentives among state-owned listed companies in China, accounting for more than 50%, while other industries have a relatively scattered proportion. This phenomenon is not caused by market reasons, but rather by the fact that manufacturing enterprises themselves account for an absolute majority of state-owned listed companies in China, which objectively leads to a corresponding increase in the number of companies implementing equity incentives.

　　（二）我国国有控股上市公司股权激励存在的问题

　　（2） The Problems of Equity Incentives in State owned Listed Companies in China

　　在十余年的实践中，我国国有控股上市公司股权激励实践积累了丰富的经验，也暴露出一些值得重视的问题。

　　In more than a decade of practice, China's state-owned listed companies have accumulated rich experience in equity incentive practices, but have also exposed some issues that deserve attention.

　　1．国有控股上市公司股权激励的股票来源问题

　　1. The issue of stock sources for equity incentives of state-owned listed companies

　　《国有控股上市公司（境内）实施股权激励试行办法》第9条规定：“实施股权激励计划所需标的股票来源，可以根据本公司实际情况，通过向款间对象发行股份、回购本公司股份及法律、行政法规允许的其他方式确定，不得由单一国有股股东支付或擅自无偿量化国有股权。”该规定直接禁止了过购本公司股份两种方式。

　　Article 9 of the Trial Measures for the Implementation of Equity Incentives by State owned Listed Companies (Domestic) stipulates that "the source of the target stocks required for the implementation of equity incentive plans can be determined based on the actual situation of the company through issuing shares to intermediary parties, repurchasing shares of the company, and other methods allowed by laws and administrative regulations. It is not allowed for a single state-owned shareholder to pay or quantify state-owned equity without authorization." This provision directly prohibits the two methods of over purchasing shares of the company.

　　回购本公司股份的方式，其优点在于不会稀释公司现有股份，影酶控制权结构，但缺点在于公司需要承担现金兑付压力，影响现金流的输定返，采用定向增发的方式则不会便公司面临较大的现金兑付压力，此检造成公司股权的稀释。从国有控股上市公司股权激励的实施現状来荐，更多的国有控股上市公司倾向于选择定向增发的方式。

　　The advantage of repurchasing the company's shares is that it does not dilute the company's existing shares and affect its control structure. However, the disadvantage is that the company needs to bear the pressure of cash redemption, which affects the fixed return of cash flow. Adopting a targeted issuance method will not put the company under significant cash redemption pressure, resulting in dilution of the company's equity. Based on the current implementation status of equity incentives in state-owned listed companies, more state-owned listed companies tend to choose the method of targeted issuance.

　　此外，值得注意的是，虽然“单一国有股股东支付或擅自无偿量化国有职权”的方式遭到了明令禁止，但部分国有控股上市公司变通地采用了由国有股东转让部分激励股票的方式解决激励股票来源问题。这在客观上容易造成国有资产流失的风险。

　　In addition, it is worth noting that although the method of "single state-owned shareholder paying or arbitrarily quantifying state-owned power without compensation" has been explicitly prohibited, some state-owned holding listed companies have flexibly adopted the method of transferring some incentive stocks from state-owned shareholders to solve the problem of incentive stock sources. This objectively poses a risk of loss of state-owned assets.

　　2．“内部人控制”现象及其引发的风险

　　2. The phenomenon of "insider control" and the risks it poses

　　国有控股上市公司大股东的缺失、公司治理结构不合理，极易引发“内部人控制”的问题，在股权激励计划的制定和实施过程中，表现为管理层的自我激励现象，这种自我激励现象一旦产生，管理层就可以通过设置过低行权价格、过低行权条件和过度激励操纵股权激励。

　　The lack of major shareholders and unreasonable corporate governance structure in state-owned listed companies can easily lead to the problem of "insider control". In the process of formulating and implementing equity incentive plans, this is manifested as self motivation by management. Once this self motivation phenomenon occurs, management can manipulate equity incentives by setting too low exercise prices, too low exercise conditions, and excessive incentives.

　　“内部人控制”还会诱发管理层操纵股价的风险问题，当国有控股上市公司高级管理人员获得实际控制权时，在股权激励计划的实施过程中，可以通过信息操纵、盈余管理甚至利润操纵来控制股票市场价格，通过压低授予日公司股票市场价格来降低行权成本，或者通过提升行权日公司股票市价来获取更多的收益，最终造成国有资产的流失。

　　Internal control can also trigger the risk of management manipulating stock prices. When senior management of state-owned listed companies gain actual control, they can control the stock market price through information manipulation, earnings management, and even profit manipulation during the implementation of equity incentive plans. They can lower the exercise cost by lowering the market price of the company's stock on the grant date, or increase the market price of the company's stock on the exercise date to obtain more returns, ultimately resulting in the loss of state-owned assets.

　　高级管理人员通过操纵股权激励、操纵股价获得了巨额非法利益，客观上作为激励对象的高管人员和普通员工的收入差距越来越大，这种差异会损大地诱发企业内部矛盾，打压普通员工的工作积极性。

　　Senior executives have obtained huge illegal benefits by manipulating equity incentives and stock prices. Objectively, the income gap between executives and ordinary employees, who are the incentive targets, is widening. This gap can lead to internal conflicts within the company and suppress the work enthusiasm of ordinary employees.

　　3．长期激励效果不显

　　3. Long term incentive effect is not significant

　　一方面，股权激励作为一种长期的激励和公司治理机制，通过不同激励式的禁售期、行权期等期限的设置，形成较长的有效期，从而实现长期的激励和约束效果。我国国有控股上市公司已公布的早期股权激励计划中，大部分计划设置的等待期都在2年或者3年，等待期过短，导致长期激励的效果难以达到。

　　On the one hand, equity incentives, as a long-term incentive and corporate governance mechanism, form a longer effective period through the setting of different incentive types such as lock up periods and exercise periods, thereby achieving long-term incentive and constraint effects. In the early equity incentive plans announced by state-owned listed companies in China, most of the plans have a waiting period of 2 or 3 years, which is too short and makes it difficult to achieve long-term incentive effects.

　　另一方面，在股权激励计划的总额上，部分国有控股上市公司在首期激励计划实施时激励总额的设置就已经接近国资委规定的10％的上限，直接透支了未来股权激励计划可使用的股份，客观上阻断了通过多期、滚动方案实现中长期激励的可能性。

　　On the other hand, in terms of the total amount of equity incentive plans, some state-owned listed companies have already set the incentive amount close to the upper limit of 10% stipulated by the State owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission during the implementation of the initial incentive plan, directly overdrawing the shares that can be used in future equity incentive plans, objectively blocking the possibility of achieving medium and long-term incentives through multi period and rolling plans.

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